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Abstract 
A well-developed financial intermediation industry increases domestic savings, 
efficiently allocates investment resources to the most productive uses in the economy and 
increases the rate of economic growth.  In the Soviet economy the banking system served 
as a means of collecting household savings and a means of distributing centrally 
determined capital grants to enterprises.  Banks then audited enterprise financial activities 
to ensure compliance to the financial plan.  After a decade the transition from the Soviet 
banking system to a market oriented banking system is incomplete and fraught with 
uncertainty.  While the number of financial institutions has increased dramatically, the 
state sector still dominates financial sector activity, the legal and regulatory framework is 
incomplete, information necessary for risk management is of poor quality and policy 
makers and regulators have been slow to act to improve intermediation services.   While 
significant progress has been made, the commonly recognized characteristics of a sound 
financial system are not yet met.   
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I.   Introduction 
 
The Russian financial crisis of 1998 not only destroyed the credibility of financial policy 
makers and the confidence of investors, but also delayed significant institutional reforms necessary 
for long-term economic progress.  While the favorable external environment of the mid-1990s 
provided support for domestic reforms and adjustment, events in global financial markets alone are 
not sufficient to explain the domestic financial collapse.  Russian financial authorities were not 
only determined to prevent exogenous external shocks from spilling over into domestic financial 
markets, but also determined to defend the exchange rate peg as the domestic GKO market 
collapsed.
2   The failure to deepen the reform of institutions and appropriately manage financial 
risk at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic level set the stage for crisis.  The deterioration 
in the terms of trade and the government’s inability to maintain federal revenue flows worsened 
fiscal imbalance and overall macroeconomic internal balance.  Huge interest rate swings and the 
devaluation of the ruble destroyed the balance sheets of major banks.
3  The Russian economy 
moved from a somewhat optimistic macroeconomic environment in 1997 and the first quarter of 
1998, to financial collapse by the end of 1998.
4   By mid-1999 the economy had stabilized and 
policy makers were taking measures to bolster the fiscal system.
5  Does the positive economic 
news represent real progress in domestic structural reform and solid economic performance?  Or, 
have the increases in the world price of oil and stabilization of global financial markets provided 
the supportive external environment that allows the fragile Russian economy to grow even without 
significant domestic reforms? 
 
In this paper I will focus on development of the domestic banking industry not only as an 
essential element of transition to a market economy, but also as a necessary factor for long-term 
economic growth.  There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature indicating a significant 
                                                           
2 GKOs, gosudarstvennye kaznacheiskie obiazatelstva, are short-term treasury bills. Foreign investors owned about 
30% of GKOs.  Granville (2000), p. 201 reports that in early 1998 there were some US$365 billion (more than 3,000% 
of the banking system assets) of outstanding foreign exchange forward contracts, mainly the result of foreign counter 
parties hedging their GKO investments.  Devaluation would, and ultimately did, render many banks insolvent.  
3 See Granville (2000), pp. 196-203 for a description of the GKO market collapse, resulting devaluation and debt 
default.  
4 During the early 1990s there were expressions of concern about the stability of the banking system and in 1995 there 
was a liquidity crisis on the inter-bank lending market.  However, some analysts were dismissive about the possibility 
of a banking system crisis:  “This talk about crisis in the midst of one of history’s largest banking booms has an air of 
unreality to it.”  Warner (1998), p. 335.  It was true that banks had extraordinary opportunities for profits because of 
the low cost of funds, but conditions can and did change rapidly.  Less than a year later in the same journal, but after 
the crisis, Buchs (1999), p.700 notes  “ . . . it is less the crisis itself but the timing of the crisis which was a surprise in 
Russia.”  
5  For a review of economic performance during the 1990s see IMF (1999), OECD (1997) and OECD (2000). Selected 
economic data may be found in tables 1-3 of the appendix.  OECD (1997) Annex V also provides a detailed 
chronology of economic events and policy measures.  On August 17, 1998 Russian authorities devalued the Ruble, 
imposed a unilateral restructuring of GKO debt and declared a 90day moratorium on private debt repayments.  
Estimates of losses to investors range from $US 20 to $US 90 billion. IMF (1999), p. 39. For a detailed description of 
the 1998 crisis see Buchs (1999) and “What Went Wrong,” Russian Economic Trends, September 1998.  And for a 
description of the results see Westin (1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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causal influence of the level of financial development upon long run economic growth.
6  Financial 
development improves the allocation of savings to investment opportunities.  The possibility of 
choosing more productive investments, which in turn generate higher rates of aggregate economic 
growth, requires improved management of liquidity risks, more efficient diversification of 
investor’s portfolios and higher quality of information about various projects and investor’s 
abilities.  As the demand for these services arises, specialized institutions develop.  But, the 
literature indicates that aggregate income and savings must reach certain levels, or thresholds, 
before institutions and markets develop spontaneously.  In transition economies economic policy 
makers may intervene, providing an environment for institutional development that may supercede 
spontaneous market developments.
7   
 
If one takes a more activist, “supply leading” financial development approach to transition 
and development, policy makers first must ask:  1).  Among financial institutions what areas 
should be developed/supported first? 2). What are the most appropriate mechanisms to enhance the 
efficiency of the financial institutions identified? 3).   What is the impact of competition and what 
is the optimal level of competition (in banking)?   And, then, more specifically, 4) at what stage of 
financial development is the Russian economy and what policies should be implemented to 
enhance long term economic growth?   
 
In the next section I briefly address questions one and two based upon a brief review of the 
financial development literature.  This provides a framework for analysis of policy and 
institutional developments.  Section 3 is a review of the banking sector’s recovery from the 1998 
crisis.  Here I also discuss policy and institutional issues which must be resolved to ensure stable, 
long-term economic growth. Section 4 concludes with concerns and issues to be resolved. 
 
II.  Development of Financial Institutions and Competitive Financial Markets 
 
The Soviet centrally planned economy had little need for a developed financial sector.  The 
payments system was simple and sound:  cash was used for household transactions and enterprise 
deposit transfers were made within the monobank for inter-enterprise transactions.  Capital and 
                                                           
6  The level of financial development is usually described by measures of “depth,” for example, the ratio of banking 
assets to GDP, or market capitalization to GDP, etc..  Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) and Pagano (1993) provide a 
brief review of the connection between financial development and growth.  Levine (1997) also provides a survey of 
issues of financial development and growth, Levine and Zervos (1998) examines potential links between both stock 
markets and commercial banks and growth, while Beck, Levine and Loayza ((2000) and Levine, Loyaza and Beck 
(2000) provide more recent empirical evidence linking financial development to economic growth.  
7  The literature discuses two approaches to financial development.  “Demand following” financial development 
follows widening of markets and product differentiation, which then requires more efficient risk diversification and 
control of transaction costs.  This type of financial development is viewed as passive or it plays at most a permissive 
role in the growth process.  “Supply leading” financial development precedes the demand for financial services and 
proponents argue it has a clear autonomous positive effect on growth due to the enhanced ability to mobilize resources, 
moving them from traditional to modern, high growth sectors.  Supply leading financial development may dominate 
the early stages of development or transition, making possible the financing and increasing the effectiveness of sectors, 
institutions and activities neglected under central planning, until demand following financial development takes over 
(a la’ Gerschenkron, 1962). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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investment funds were available via direct grants from the state budget according to the central 
plan.  The banking system functioned simply as a payments system and state auditor to monitor 
plan fulfillment.
8  Monetary policy was accommodating, ensuring that cash supplies met demand 
and enterprise deposit creation from the state budget corresponded to plan, both according to micro 
objectives as well as balancing in the aggregate to prevent inflation.  Barter transactions in both the 
household and enterprise sectors and unplanned transactions within the enterprise sector were 
tolerated to smooth the operation of the plan.  The financial plan governed the allocation of 
society’s savings among potential investment opportunities typically based upon political 
objectives rather than financial criteria.
9  While the banking system in a market economy is a 
critical element of the payments system, it also plays an active role in the allocation of investment 
resources.  
 
Why focus on the banking sector? 
 
In the Soviet system the banking system did not provide financial intermediation services. 
Developed market economies, though, have both stock and bond markets and developed financial 
intermediaries such as banks.  There is considerable discussion about which is more important.  
There is also a debate about the effectiveness of universal banking vis-à-vis specialized banking 
coupled with stock markets.  Despite the nuances and the different routes taken, developed market 
economies have tended to converge toward a similar model of corporate finance.  In developed 
economies, retained earnings or internally generated funds account for roughly 60 to 90% of 
investment financing, bank loans account for roughly 15 to 30% and bond and equity offerings just 
a few percent.  In developing economies both bank loans, accounting for 25-35%, and equity 
markets, accounting for as much as 25%, play a slightly more important role in investment 
financing than in developed economies.  While this varies over time and across countries, retained 
earnings remain the dominant source of funds, with bank lending next, and equities markets 
relatively unimportant in terms of providing finance for investment projects.  In fact, Stiglitz 
(1993) argues that stock markets are primarily a means of sharing risk, not raising investment 
funds.  When there are production risks, information asymmetries and costly monitoring, debt 
contracts with fixed repayment dates will always be preferred (by investors) to the purchase of 
shares with periodic reimbursement by payments of dividends that are subject to productivity 
shocks.  Thus, bank intermediation is likely to play a significantly larger role in investment 
financing regardless of stage of development.     
 
Monitoring costs are minimized with debt contracts because such costs are incurred only in 
the case of insolvency, while financing via shares requires continuous, ongoing monitoring.  Banks 
and lending intermediaries have an advantage over stock and bond markets because they can be 
more efficient in terms of information gathering and monitoring.  It is not efficient for an 
individual investor to undertake these costs, but banks can spread them out over many investors 
(depositors).  Because some of the information collected on the performance of a firm becomes 
                                                           
8 The three primary functions of the Soviet monobank were financial control of enterprises, dispersement of funds 
allocated by the central plan and mobilization of domestic savings to finance domestic debt of the state sector. 
9 For the classic description of the Soviet system of money and banking see Garvey (1977).  For a more recent 
discussion of both Soviet banking and transition in the early 1990s see Tompson (1997). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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public, there is also a free rider problem that makes capturing payment for monitoring costs 
problematic.   With large diversified portfolios banks can guarantee a yield on deposits and make a 
credible commitment to monitoring investment projects.  Thus, the informational advantage of 
banks as a source of external financing of investment is a strong argument in favor of emphasizing 
the development of the banking system as a means of enhancing capital accumulation.  In fact, 
Wright, Buck and Filatotchev (1998) provide evidence that banks in Russia are beginning to 
develop oversight and monitoring relationships with loan recipients, albeit at a relatively slow 
pace. Banks may not be superior to stock markets at all stages of development, however.  Both 
provide diversification and management of liquidity risk, provide a monitoring mechanism, which 
improves the management of resources, and provide means of evaluating the returns on investment 
activities, all of which contribute to the efficient allocation of resources.  Competition among 
banks and between banking intermediaries and stock markets leads to lower intermediation costs 
and contributes to economic growth.  But competition also leads to increased probability of 
insolvency, credit rationing and related adverse effects on growth.  The optimal level of 
competition is a policy issue of importance in both market economies and transition economies.  
 
The performance of intermediation services takes a well functioning payments system for 
granted.  In any economy a well functioning payments system, a reliable and flexible means of 
exchange and payment, is necessary for growth.   While the Soviet economy payments system was 
reliable, it was not flexible and does not satisfy the needs of participants in a market economy.   
Without direct capital grants from the central budget, enterprise projects must compete for funds, 
either internally, from retained earnings, or externally, from bank loans or securities offerings. 
Outside-the-payments-system transactions such as barter are also possible, but are costly.  These 
costs often eliminate potential productivity gains due to increases in the division of labor and thus 
reduce the profitability of potential projects.  In a market economy a financial system with low 
transaction costs develops in order to reduce the opportunity cost of holding money. As a result the 
payments system in a market economy evolves toward a credit system managed by banking 
intermediaries.  Technological advances continuously reduce the information costs of utilizing 
credit while financial assets and credit instruments gradually replace traditional monetary assets.  
This is reflected by increases in the weight of financial activities in GDP as economic development 
takes place. Thus, the velocity of narrow monetary aggregates increases after a certain stage of 
development and the increase in this measure of velocity is paralleled by the development of 
intermediation technologies.
10 
 
Demonetization and nonpayments 
 
In a transition economy changes in the velocity of narrow money aggregates must be 
interpreted with caution, however. Measurement problems are severe.  In Russia the method for 
calculating GDP is being refined, defining and measuring monetary aggregates is difficult, and the 
                                                           
10 Note that in very early stages of economic development the economy is increasingly monetised as transactions 
become more complicated and sophisticated, thus there is a secular downward trend in money velocity.  However, 
after some threshold level of development, pressure to reduce the opportunity cost of holding money leads to the 
replacement of money with credit instruments and an increase in the velocity of narrow money aggregates.  The strong 
empirical link between GDP and degree of monetisation is demonstrated by Goldsmith (1969). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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amount of dollars in cash in circulation is large and difficult to measure.
11 Further, significant 
changes in the behavior of economic agents have occurred and creation of new monetary and 
credit instruments is rapid and unpredictable.  Demonetisation in the Russian economy may 
increase or decrease velocity for reasons completely independent of financial development.  For 
example, in 1994 the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) began to implement more stringent prudential 
regulations at the same time monetary policy was tightened.  A crisis in the inter-bank lending 
market in 1995 led financial intermediaries to innovate, creating new types of securities to 
facilitate payments.
12  There was a rapid increase in the use of cash surrogates including barter, 
sometimes complicated offset arrangements (zachety), bills of exchange (veksels), and various 
federal, regional and local securities.
13  There was also a rapid increase in payments arrears.  While 
some of these activities may be considered a first step toward financial deepening, employing 
primitive payments and intermediation technologies with high transactions costs, such as barter 
and illiquid offset arrangements, is clearly a step backward.
14  Only if orderly secondary markets 
for zachety and veksels are developed may it be interpreted as a step forward.  Matters were 
complicated at this time as the practice of issuing credit denominated in bills of exchange allowed 
banks to facilitate tax evasion, disguise bad loans by converting them to veksel credits and avoid 
provision requirements. Lack of transparency in accounting complicated matters further as prices 
varied depending upon the means of payment, confounding efforts to improve corporate 
governance, restructure enterprises and enforce tax and other regulations.
15  Corruption and illegal 
activities also flourished.
16  By 1997-98 money surrogates accounted for over half of industrial 
transactions and consolidated budget revenues.  In many regions of the country this share reached 
70%.
17    
 
While Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000) argue for a complete dismantling of the 
nonpayments system, there were some positive aspects.
 18  It in fact represented an evolutionary 
step in the financial development process.  In response to very contractionary macroeconomic 
policy and the elimination of direct enterprise subsidies, in a system with soft budget constraints, 
                                                           
11 Buchs (1999) reports dollarization of 10% of GDP.   
12 Tightening of monetary policy and higher real interest rates led to liquidity problems and banks in turn borrowed 
heavily on the inter-bank loan market for liquidity.  Both volume and rates increased leading many banks to withdraw 
from the market. On August 23-24 overnight rates spiked, lending was rationed and the market collapsed.  The Central 
Bank was only partially accommodating and several hundred banks failed.  See OECD (1997), p. 82 for additional 
details. 
13 OECD (1997), Annex II discusses the development of various money surrogates.  Veksels may be promissory notes 
or, if tradable, bills of exchange.  They perform a much broader role, however, serving as the equivalent of debt 
instruments like certificates of deposit, commercial paper, simple IOUs and bonds.   
14 While OECD (1997), Chapter 2 describes the introduction of new securities and means of payment as important 
innovations and monetary and institutional changes at this time in a positive tone, the chapter concludes with a section 
titled “Commercial banking in the Russian Federation:  the first signs of stability or impending crisis?” Conditions 
deteriorated rapidly from the time of printing and within a year the financial system collapsed.   
15 Barter and offset prices tended to be higher than veksel prices that in turn were higher than cash prices for the same 
commodities.  See OECD (2000) pp.91, 92. 
16 See Gaddy and Ickes (2001), Woodruff (1999) and Commander and Mumssen (1998) for further analysis of non-
monetary transactions and the impact upon decision-making in the Russian economy. 
17  For additional details on demonetisation see OECD (2000), Chapter 2. 
18 Note that Pinto, et al. (2000), p. 1, defines non-payments as 1) arrears and 2) all forms of non cash settlements 
including barter, veksels or promissory notes and tax offsets whereby government spending arrears and overdue tax 
payments are mutually cancelled.  I focus on non-cash payments or cash surrogates since these actually are a means of 
conducting payments, either at a discount or premium, which may compete with payments within the banking system. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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cash short enterprises resorted to non-cash surrogates for payments both with each other and with 
the Treasury.  Fiscal authorities permitted and enhanced the development of non-cash instruments 
for fiscal purposes as a means of supporting inefficient enterprises, which could no longer be 
subsidized directly.  As international financial institutions objected to the use of a particular 
instrument it was eliminated, but quickly replaced by another nearly equivalent instrument.
19    
 
The share of non-cash transactions varied by industrial branch, but clearly increased 
through the 1990s, as indicated in Figure 1 and Table 1. The increase in offset arrangements in 
1996-1998 also paralleled the increase of enterprise payments arrears, as they became the 
dominant form of non-cash payments.  While it may be argued that offset arrangements prevented 
a further contraction in the economy and to some extent provided liquidity (some offsets were 
tradable) they also were very inefficient as a means of payment since transactions costs were 
extremely high and they facilitated the continuing distortion of relative prices.
20  With the 
development of alternative credit instruments barter should decrease over time.   
 
There are three causes noted for the Russian demonetisation: 1) barter occurred between 
enterprises that had Soviet era links and was facilitated by trade institutions that act much like 
Gossnab
21 did, 2) macroeconomic policy, the elimination of directed credits and high interest rates, 
increased the opportunity cost of money, encouraging financial innovation and the creation of non-
money means of payments, and 3) barter and varying prices for differing means of payment 
facilitated tax avoidance.  Clearly all three reasons contributed to the demonetisation, but by 1999 
world oil prices and export earnings increased, and interest rates came down, all providing greater 
liquidity to the economy overall, and the need for monetary surrogates declined.  The banking 
system stabilized and transaction levels within the payments system returned to more normal 
levels.  While stable, the system is still far from liberalized. 
 
Financial Repression and Liberalization 
 
McKinnon (1973) defines financial repression as any policy or regulation that prevents 
financial intermediaries from operating at a level in accordance with their technological potential.  
Typical repressive policies of the banking system in a market-type economy are forms of implicit 
or indirect taxation of financial intermediaries or transactions.  The most common are bank reserve 
requirements with low or zero yield, ceilings or controls on lending and deposit rates, and the 
                                                           
19 For example, treasury tax offsets were employed in 1994-1996 then replaced by direct monetary offsets in 1996, 
1997, which were replaced by reverse monetary offsets in 1997, 1998, which in turn were replaced by targeted 
financing. See Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000).   
20  It is also important to note that a large portion of the increase in arrears was due to the accumulation of penalties 
and fines on enterprises for late payment of taxes and payments to the government. Government-organization to 
government-organization payments arrears do not accrue fines and penalties and thus the proportion of enterprise 
arrears to government as a proportion of total arrears increased.  Penalties and fines amounted to 65% of all debt to the 
Federal budget by the end of 1997.  While the initial payment arrear is viewed by some as an increase in “soft credit” 
to the enterprise sector, the accumulation of fines and penalties probably should not be.  See Mumssen (1998) and 
OECD (2000).  
21   Gossnab, the State Committee on Material and Technical Supply, was one of the most important state committees 
instrumental in developing, coordinating and enforcing the central plan during the Soviet era. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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inflation tax on monetary assets in general.  The costs include the loss in efficiency due to the 
distortions in interest rates, credit rationing and overall discouraged savings due to low deposit 
rates.
22  In addition, the market structure itself must be considered as a potential limiting factor on 
the development of the financial system. Stiglitz (1994) emphasizes market failure and the need for 
government intervention of various sorts to improve efficiency in the financial system.
23  There is 
considerable debate in the literature on both the optimal level of competition and the need for and 
type of government intervention, however.
24   
 
With virtually no lending activity, strict controls on deposit accounts and rate ceilings and 
complete monopolization of the banking system during the centrally planned era, the Russian 
banking system has evolved from what may be considered an extreme in terms of financial 
repression.  To complicate matters Russian bank management was not prepared to operate the 
newly created commercial banks as profit maximizing banks in a market economy.
25 Russian 
banks were not able to identify potentially profitable investments, due to the lack of business 
reputations and reliable credit histories, predominance of insider control (politically supported) in 
enterprises, weak contract enforcement and an underdeveloped legal system.  Although bank 
managers are slowly developing the skills to engage in effective project appraisal and monitoring, 
they have weak incentives to develop these skills as long as there are alternative, cheaper sources 
of high profits, like government securities.  
 
The benefits of liberalization seem obvious, but the pace and timing of liberalization are 
critical.  Many argue that the fiscal deficit must be under control prior to liberalization because 
significant increases in interest rates to dampen growth or control inflation may lead to adverse 
selection in bank lending activity, thereby threatening the soundness of the banking system.  In 
addition, many argue that a perfectly competitive banking industry will under provide financial 
services because of the public good nature of the information on profitability of entering the 
deposit market by individual banks and the high cost of entering the market.  Thus, Hellman, et al. 
(1997) argue that “mild” financial repression may be beneficial because it creates rent 
                                                           
22  The costs can be significant.  In a study of twenty-six developing countries the inflation tax was estimated at 2.8% 
of GDP and ceilings on interest rates generated a tax equivalent to 1.8% of GDP.  See Berthelemy and Varoudakis 
(1996).   
23 Stiglitz (1994) notes seven types of market failure: 1) monitoring as a public good, 2) externalities of monitoring, 
selection and lending, 3) externalities of financial disruption, 4) missing and incomplete markets, 5) imperfect 
competition, 6) Pareto inefficiency of competitive markets, and 7) uninformed investors. He then provides a taxonomy 
of government interventions which may be appropriate.  Levine (1996) provides a framework for policy analysis and 
government intervention.  Harwood and Smith (1997) provides an extensive look at financial development strategies 
for  developing countries. 
24 For example, Jaramillo-Vallejo (1994) takes issue with Stiglitz’s arguments for government intervention. 
25 Tompson (1997) argues that at least through the mid-1990s Russian banks really did not bank.  They did little to 
collect deposits and did little lending except to the state.  A large share of their liabilities were free and a large share of 
their assets were idle.  Banks maintained a high level of excess reserves even during highly inflationary periods.  This 
activity is not necessarily financial repression via government policies, but by poor management. Iskyan and Besedin 
(2000) call Russian banks “bank-like institutions” and Schoor (2001) maintains most banks are simply treasury 
operations of their enterprise owners. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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opportunities that enhance incentives for financial deepening and deposit mobilization.
26  And Van 
Wijnbergen (1983) argues that informal financing that developed early in many developing 
economies may actually be more efficient than intermediated financing in a liberalized system.  
But this is true only if the informal sector has higher quality information on risk and lending 
opportunities.  While all three caveats may apply to the Russian economy to a limited extent, 
recent research indicates that the effects of financial liberalization on economic growth are “not 
subsumed by other economic reforms or proxies for the development of capital markets and 
financial intermediation.”
27     Therefore liberalization, per se, should proceed as quickly as 
possible.  
 
A liberalized financial system contributes to overall economic growth by increasing 
savings.  Financial markets and banking intermediaries improve the mobilization of savings, 
providing higher than expected yields and greater diversification of risk.  This in turn encourages 
financial savings rather than the purchase of consumer durables (or real assets with a low rate of 
return).  Such a reorientation of savings reinforces the deepening of the financial system.
28  This 
pattern may not be observed in the transition economy as pent up consumer demand is released in 
the initial period.  The financial crisis in Russia (as well as other transition economies) then 
introduced skepticism on the part of savers and weakened the credibility of the financial system 
overall.  The fact that there is no universal deposit insurance system for Russian savers also 
discourages savings.  Because Sberbank is the only institution with state support perceived to be 
equivalent to deposit guarantees, households transferred deposits from independent, private 
commercial banks to Sberbank.
29  The share of total household deposits held by Sberbank 
increased from just over 50% in mid-1994 to over 85% by January 1999, then declined slowly to 
just over 75% in April 2001.  One reason that other commercial banks, private and state-owned, 
cannot compete in the deposit market is because they lack the deposit guarantees that Sberbank 
offers implicitly.  Thus, to increase savings government policy should reduce the risks to 
depositors associated with saving via bank deposits by developing a system of deposit insurance 
and by eliminating the household deposit monopoly Sberbank enjoys.  There has been tremendous 
resistance to this, however, as evidenced by the continuing discussion of the proposed federal laws 
on deposit insurance.
30  
 
                                                           
26 It is difficult to ascertain what level of repression is optimal.  E.g., mild financial repression may include deposit rate 
ceilings, which enhance franchise values.  However, if ceilings and other regulations diminish competition and hinder 
the efficient allocation of resources diminishing growth then liberalization is in order. 
27 Bekaert and Harvey (2001), p. 11. 
28 Actually, income and substitution effects make the a priori outcome on growth indeterminate. 
29   The August 1998 crisis led Sberbank to lose half of its net assets when the government defaulted on GKOs.    The 
government bailed out Sberbank, whereas depositors at other failing institutions (Menatep, Most, SBS-Agro, 
Inkombank, Mosbiznesbank, and Promstroibank) were required to transfer deposits to Sberbank at unfavorable terms.  
See Buchs (1999) p. 693 and Schoers (2001).  
30 The Antimonopoly Ministry, however, has initiated three proceedings against Sberbank and the CBR since the 
beginning of this year.  However, all decisions taken concerning the promotion of competition in the banking sector 
must be submitted to the CBR, which  “seems to deliberately hinder any attempts to achieve this task.” Russian 
Economic Trends, (April, 2001), p. 6.  It should also be emphasized that Sberbank’s advantages in the deposit market 
also contribute to an inefficient allocation of capital at the macro level since its assets are held predominately in 
government securities or loans to large state owned enterprises, replicating investment patterns of the Soviet era..  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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A liberalized system also improves the allocation of resources, increasing capital 
productivity and economic growth.  The inherent difficulties of resource allocation, with 
productivity risks, insufficient and imperfect information on the return on investment and 
entrepreneurs’ skills, provide opportunities for creation of financial intermediation services.   
Financial institutions provide diversification of risks associated with productivity and demand 
shocks, manage liquidity risks and evaluate potential projects and entrepreneurs.  These activities 
increase the rate of economic growth by increasing the resources invested in productive activities, 
increasing technological specialization,
31 reducing the premature liquidation of capital
32 and 
increasing productive efficiency. Evaluating projects and entrepreneurs, essentially assessment and 
monitoring, has very large fixed costs which financial intermediaries can spread over many 
investors, no one of which would be willing to pay the initial fixed costs.  The intermediary can 
evaluate more projects, collect more information and provide it in a standardized form to large 
numbers of investors who then choose among varying levels of risk depending upon their risk 
preference. As a result of better assessment of risk and better information, more resources can be 
directed toward the most productive or profitable projects.   Monitoring and diversifying systemic 
shocks also allows an increase in resources invested in productive, but riskier projects, therefore 
increasing the overall productivity of the economy’s capital stock. 
 
The working of financial intermediaries described above stands in stark contrast to the 
allocation of capital in the Soviet system in which crude indicators of effectiveness, imperfect 
information and political forces guided central planners’ investment decisions.  The Russian 
banking system is painfully evolving from one which served as the agent of central planners 
toward a system of market driven, profit oriented financial intermediaries.  But it is far from that 
goal.  First, the financial services industry is far from competitive.  Although the number of 
commercial banks is large, just over 1,300, activity is highly concentrated.  As of April 2001 
Sberbank accounted for over 75% of household savings deposits.  Sberbank accounts for about 
20% of lending and Vneshtorg bank accounts for about 5%.  These banks have very little lending 
experience and will likely favor large enterprises in priority sectors not unlike the Soviet pattern of 
investments. As Table 2 indicates total domestic credit as a share of GDP is about 60% of the 
comparable market economy (ME) and private sector credit relative to GDP is less than 50% of the 
ME benchmark. Second, while the number of privately owned banks is decreasing, the state also 
continues to found new banks, Rossiiski Bank Razvitiya (the Russian Development Bank) in 1999 
and Rosselkhozbank (the Russian Agricultural Bank) in 2000, which are likely to have different 
investment objectives, enjoy the implicit guarantees of the state, and therefore will likely provide 
directed, soft credits to industry and agriculture.  Given that private sector lending activity is 
lagging dramatically (as indicated in Table 2) a more appropriate policy may be the creation of 
institutions subject to market discipline, but designed to meet the financing needs of small and 
medium enterprises in the private sector.  On the positive side, smaller, regional banks, which were 
less affected by the 1998 crisis, are in a position to expand their activities.
33   
 
                                                           
31 To reduce the risk of disruption in the demand for products produced with highly specialized technologies 
(technology risk) firms often invest in less specialized and therefore less productive, flexible technologies.  Therefore, 
diversification via activities of financial intermediaries, allows more investment in highly specialized, more productive 
technologies. 
32 The law of large numbers reduces the probability that all depositors/investors withdraw at the same time. 
33   See Schoors (2001) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Third, information on enterprise performance, potential investment returns and 
entrepreneurial talents is very limited and of poor quality regardless of whether intermediaries or 
individual investors collect the information.  In fact, even official, legally required information is 
often incorrect. 
34  Fourth, most banks are acting primarily as treasury operations of their owners or 
acting implicitly as an agent of the government in lending activities, in effect continuing the 
history of centrally directed capital grants, but now with a weak expectation of repayment. As 
indicated in Tables 3 and 4 below loans (claims on the private sector) account for roughly one-
third of the banking sectors assets.  Tompson (1997) notes in 1995 that only 49.5% of assets were 
nominally income earning, probably much less if non-performing loans were excluded.
35    
 
The distribution of assets indicates moral hazard issues remain a serious problem.  It was 
suggested above that the introduction of deposit insurance would enhance competition, increase 
aggregate savings and improve the allocation of liabilities within the banking system.  A second, 
perhaps more important reason to introduce a system of risk-based deposit insurance, is that an 
explicit system of guarantees is a more efficient means of reducing moral hazard and improving 
resource allocation than the current system of implicit guarantees.  Since the financial institution 
itself determines the size of the implied guarantee, the institution can expand the implicit subsidy 
by doing more and riskier lending.  Explicit risk-based guarantees can be limited, however.  By 
pricing the deposit insurance in accordance with the institution’s risk profile moral hazard can be 
limited and discrepancies between depositors’, insurers’ and lenders’ risk tolerances are narrowed.  
Thus, a system of risk based deposit insurance benefits not only individual depositors, but also 
reduces system risk by reducing moral hazard.   A prerequisite for an effective system of risk 
based deposit insurance is the ability to measure risk, i.e., accurate financial information and 
uniform accounting standards providing greater transparency of bank activity.  Legal reforms in 
the Russian banking system are gradually providing the foundations for these prerequisites, but 
currently, accurately measuring risk exposure of individual banks is difficult if not impossible.  
 
The financial system is not passive in a market economy, but accelerates growth in the real 
sector.  The organization of financial intermediation networks is expensive, however.  The level of 
financial sector development and economic activity is inter-related.  Because the bulk of costs in 
establishing an intermediation network are the initial fixed costs, threshold effects are typical.  An 
economy develops a specific type of intermediation system corresponding to the overall level of 
economic activity, which may be proxied by the level of per capita income.  Then as per capita 
income increases, at some point the benefits of expanding or innovating within the intermediation 
system are perceived and capturable, the next stage of financial development begins.  The benefits 
of deepening the financial system have a positive effect on overall economic growth and create the 
possibility of a circular relationship between financial development and growth.  In this case a 
                                                           
34 Iskayan and Besedin (2000), p.5 reports that ”a CBR audit of financial statements submitted to it found that roughly 
half of a representative group of banks systematically falsified reports.”  In addition, even if information reported is 
correct, Russian accounting standards make it difficult to understand an enterprise’s condition and inter-enterprise 
payments problems, and non-payments, make it difficult for managers to assess their own enterprise’s performance, 
much less to convince potential lenders/investors.  
35 Thomson (1997), p. 1176.  Note the level of lending was low and very short term, typically 30-60 days.  No doubt 
the high and variable inflation of the time was a significant deterrent to lending. Although inflation has been reduced 
banks still tend to lend short term to finance transactions (e.g., imports) or acquisitions rather than longer term 
investment projects. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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“virtuous circle” in which high income levels support development of the financial system and 
development of the financial system makes possible higher rates of growth.  On the other hand, an 
underdevelopment trap or low-level equilibria may result.  In an underdeveloped economy with 
few growth prospects, low-income levels make the development of the financial system 
impossible, which in turn hinders the allocation of resources to investment and further weakens 
growth.
36  When financial institutions are inadequately developed selecting more flexible, less 
specialized, and therefore less productive technologies mitigates production risk.  But reduction in 
risk by technological flexibility in production weakens the incentives to develop financial markets 
and banking intermediaries that involve substantial fixed costs.  This results in a low level 
equilibrium with an underdeveloped financial system.
37  A more developed financial system 
enables selection of more specialized, more risky but more productive production technologies.  
And, the resulting increase in risk is more easily diversified and mitigated by the existence of a 
developed financial system.    
 
Before turning to a description of the Russian banking system it is important to realize that 
the banking industry in a market economy is typically not a perfectly competitive industry, but 
characterized by varying degrees of imperfect competition.  Thus, in a transition economy policies 
should encourage competition, recognizing that the optimal level of competition is unclear.  
Natural imperfections in the banking system in a market economy arise due to the information 
intensive functions of the system.  The activity of gathering and processing information on 
investments involves large fixed costs, which leads to imperfect competition and market 
segmentation.  Because lenders (savers) and investors (borrowers) are generally not the same 
individuals there are information asymmetries since investors have better access to information 
about the quality and likely success of investment projects than lenders do.  Therefore the 
functioning of financial markets is characterized by adverse selection and adverse incentives.  
Although banking is often monopolistically competitive Stiglitz (1994) argues greater competition 
is a two edged sword.  Compression of intermediation margins via greater competition erodes 
profits and makes the system more vulnerable to productivity shocks as it increases the possibility 
of insolvency.  Unlike other sectors insolvency in the banking sector can have wide spread 
negative repercussions on the rest of the economy as the volume of lending and activity in the real 
sector decline.   Also, when a bank goes bankrupt the information it has collected on its particular 
clients or sector of lending activity may simply disappear.  If so this leads to borrower rationing, 
which has a negative impact upon growth – the opposite effect that we would expect from 
compressing intermediation margins.  The optimal level of competition, or the optimal 
intermediation margin, is not that of a perfectly competitive market.  Reaching that optimal level is 
difficult in a well functioning market environment and particularly difficult in a transition 
environment like that of Russia today.   
 
III.  The State of the Banking System:  Crisis, recovery and crisis?  
 
                                                           
36 See Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Levine (1992b), Townsend (1983). 
37 See  Saint-Paul (1992). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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System characteristics and policy framework  
 
While the overall level of financial development in a transition economy is difficult to 
measure, traditional indicators of financial development indicate the Russian financial sector is 
underdeveloped vis-à-vis market economies even after the crisis and stabilization of the system.  
As Table 5 indicates banking system assets as a percentage of GDP has increased from 22.2% in 
1995 to 32.0% in 2000.  This ratio for a market economy is typically in the 50-60% range.
38  Loans 
to GDP has increased from 8.7% to 12.3%.  Banking system capital as a percentage of GDP has 
fluctuated, but averaged about 5.5%, in the range of a market economy, typically 5-6%.
39  While 
these aggregate measures seem to be improving it should be noted again that total domestic credit 
relative to GDP is about 60% of the comparable market economy and private sector credit relative 
to GDP is well less than half that of the comparable market economy (see Table 2).  Further, these 
proportions have not changed during the last five years.  Importantly the aggregate measures 
conceal the fact that the Russian banking industry is highly concentrated.  At the end of 1997, just 
prior to the 1998 crisis, the top five banks accounted for 36% of total assets, and the top 50 
accounted for 71%.
40  Also, as mentioned above, Sberbank holds roughly 75% of household 
deposits.  Including enterprise deposits the top five banks accounted for 58% of ruble deposits and 
the top 50 banks accounted for 65% at the end of 1997.
41   
 
Since 1998 bank restructuring has taken place, albeit at a pace that some see as too slow.  
The crisis led to a dramatic decline in bank capital and a deposit run on the large Moscow banks 
leaving the majority of them insolvent.  The Central Bank of Russia adopted emergency measures 
forcing six large commercial banks to transfer the bulk of household deposits to Sberbank, with 
any remaining deposits frozen.
42  This prevented further withdrawals by the population and 
stabilized the payments system.  However, the CBR was unable to move quickly to close large 
insolvent banks, which were at the heart of the influential Financial Industrial Groups, or to extend 
rehabilitation credits in a timely manner.  Although the Bank had the power to revoke licenses and 
take over the management of insolvent banks, the attempts to do so immediately after the crisis 
were unsuccessful.
43  Legal delays and political maneuvering allowed assets to be transferred from 
the failing institutions to newly created shell banks and balance sheets were unilaterally 
restructured.  Although the Agency for Restructuring Credit Organizations (ARCO) was 
                                                           
38 Great Britain and Japan are extremes with bank system assets as a percent of GDP at 270% and 159% in 1990 and 
1993 respectively.  Warner (1998), Table 2. 
39 Note though that GDP has fluctuated greatly and published data are sometime suspect.  Therefore these ratios should 
be interpreted with caution.  See Iskyan and Besedin (2000) p. 21. 
40 Russian Federation (1997), p. 88. 
41 Russian Federation (1997), p. 88. 
42 These banks were Inkombank, SBS-Agro, Moct-Bank, Rossiiskii Kredit, Menatep and Promstroibank.  Also see 
OECD (1997) Annex I for a discussion of the largest 23 banks prior to the crisis. 
43 For example, the CBR’s initial attempt to revoke the license of Inkombank was contested in court and it was not 
until June 2000 that the revocation of the license was allowed to stand and a Moscow arbitration court named external 
managers to liquidate the bank.  See Iskyan and Besedin (2000) for a chronology of this case and a primer on asset 
stripping. Also see Schoors (1999). Another notable case is that of Promstroibank.  In July 1999 the CBR withdrew 
Promstroibank’s license and it was declared bankrupt. Various government officials declared their support of 
Promstroibank, the bankruptcy procedures were halted and the license suspension declared illegal, even though the 
bank was insolvent.  In November 2000 an arbitration court ruled the CBR’s actions were legal and proceedings were 
to continue.  See Russian Economic Trends (November, 2000), p. 17. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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established rather quickly, in November 1998, its effectiveness also was limited in the early period 
after the crisis.
44 It was capitalized with R 10 billion, the state holding 51% of its shares and the 
Central Bank of Russia 49%, an amount estimated at about 10% of that necessary for a complete 
recapitalization of the banking system.
45   
 
By mid-2000 the results of ARCO’s modest efforts were becoming visible.
46  Temporary 
administration was imposed upon Most Bank in May and Vneshtorgbank purchased it in October 
2000.  SBS Agro and Mezhkombank were bankrupted.  Bankruptcy proceedings continue with 
Promstroibank and Menatep, Mosbusinessbank and Imperial Bank remain in receivership, or are 
battling for survival.
47  The first bank to emerge from ARCO management, in 2001, is 
Chelyabkomzembank, purchased by Rosselkhozbank the wholly state-owned bank created in April 
2000.  A restructuring plan for Uneximbank was approved and shareholders approved its merger 
with Rosbank (the bridge bank of Rossiisky Credit).
48  In addition, the Central Bank is expected to 
divest itself of ownership in all banks.  It sold its interest in five Russian owned foreign-based 
banks (roszagranbanks) to Vneshtorgbank this year and will sell its ownership in Vneshtorgbvank 
by 2002 and in Sberbank by 2004.   
  
The foundation of the Russian banking system is provided by two fundamental laws, the 
Law on Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the Law on Banks and Banking Activity and 
by various parts of the civil code, in particular bankruptcy provisions and the tax code.  The 
Central Bank of Russia carries the responsibility for not only monetary policy, but also bank 
licensing and prudential and regulatory oversight.  Although the banking laws originated from the 
Soviet era, they have been amended many times.  The 1995 amendments gave the Central Bank 
greater independence and made it the lender of last resort.
49   
 
In 1999 Russian authorities provided a stronger foundation for bankruptcy and bank 
rehabilitation, and the framework to accelerate the process of bank restructuring by passing two 
new laws.  The Law on Insolvency of Credit Organizations strengthened the CBR’s intervention 
powers and the Law on Restructuring of Credit Organizations (June 1999) gave sole responsibility 
for restructuring banks to ARCO, provided for an equitable and transparent mechanism for 
shareholder write downs, and empowered ARCO to invalidate transactions made with the intent to 
defraud depositors and creditors of insolvent banks.
50  In the spring of 2001 the Duma passed three 
bills (incorporating most of the Putin government’s proposal referred to as the Gref Program or the 
“IMF package”) which gave the Central Bank of Russia additional supervisory powers, introduced 
                                                           
44 It lacked funding and authority.  Its first board meeting was held in March 1999. See  Russian Economic Trends, 
March 1999, p. 3. 
45 Russian Economic Trends, December, 1998, p. 3 
46 While there are tangible results of ARCO’s efforts critics maintain they are negligible since these banks are very 
small compared to the overall banking system and these bailouts may be seen as benefiting incompetent managers and 
therefore increasing moral hazard.  The overall benefit to the banking system remains an open question. 
47 See Russian Economic Trends, various issues, (2000), (2001). 
48 Note that Uneximbank may be the only bank to be successfully restructured without assistance from ARCO or any 
other state agency.  Russian Economic Trends, October 2000, p. 13. 
49  For additional details see OECD (1997), pp. 83,84. 
50 IMF (1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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the legal concepts of a banking group and holding, streamlined the procedures for bankruptcy of 
credit organizations and revised the responsibilities of bank founders, shareholders and managers.
 
51 Inter alia, specific legal criteria were introduced to facilitate the CBR’s actions to withdraw 
banking licenses and initiate bankruptcy procedures which are expected to eliminate the legal 
wrangling typical of most recent actions initiated by the CBR. Given the new legislation it appears 
that a second phase in bank restructuring may now be undertaken.
52 
 
Recovery of Banking Activity 
 
Only recently has macroeconomic performance allowed banks to rebuild reserves 
and slowly increase the level of confidence of depositors and investors. Growth in the 
banking sector has been driven by the overall positive developments in the real sector and 
increasing demand for banking services. Bank loans increased 66% in 2000 and nine out of 
ten banks were reporting profits.  By the first quarter of 2001 assets of commercial banks 
reached 93% of the pre-crisis level in real terms, and hard currency assets were 43% of 
total assets.
53  As personal incomes recovered, household deposits in the banking sector 
have increased and the share held by Sberbank has stabilized at just over 75% in June 2001. 
(Also see Figure 2.)  By the spring of 2001 lending had increased to about 40% of assets in 
the Russian banking sector.  This is improved, but still very low compared with the 80-90% 
typical of a bank in a developed market economy. Further, Sberbank and Vneshtorg Bank, 
the two largest state owned banks, accounted for most of the lending to the real economy.
54  
 
Although lending has increased, Russian commercial banks still hold unusually large 
amounts of non-income producing excess reserves, illustrated in Figure 3.  Due to the high risk of 
lending to the productive sphere of the economy loans amount to less than 45% of assets.  Nearly 
15% of assets are held in non-interest bearing accounts at the CBR. Given the high inflation 
environment this obviously impacts bank profitability.  The lack of lending to enterprises, 
investment into the real economy, also limits economic growth. This is not a new phenomenon, 
however.  Throughout the 1990s banks held very low levels of income earning assets.
55 This is 
attributable to the inability of bank managers to find, evaluate and monitor viable investment 
projects, and extreme caution with respect to the possibility of bank deposit runs and risks 
associated with inter-bank lending.   The government has pressured banks to increase lending and, 
as mentioned above, created two new banks, Rosiiski Bank Razvitiya (the Russian Development 
Bank) and Rosselkhozbank (the Russian Agricultural Bank), to expand lending in critical areas.
56   
 
                                                           
51 See Iskyan and Besedin (2001), Appendix B for a summary of the Gref Program and the corresponding legislation. 
52 Russian Econopmic Trends, June 2001, p. 8. 
53 Russian Economic Trends, June, 2001, p. 7. 
54 Russian Economic Trends, May 2001, p. 6. 
55   See OECD (1997, pp. 85-86. 
56 Of course the consequences of such pressures are problematic to the extent that related-party lending  some of which 
may not be market driven intermediation, and lending to state institutions distorts the allocation of financial capital.  
Related-party lending and its consequences is very difficult to measure, however.  See Iskyan and Besedin (2001) p. 
15. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Increased lending is a double-edged sword, however. The rapid increase in bank lending 
requires increased diligence upon the part of bank regulators.  Although bank capital increased 
43% in 2000, under capitalization is still a serious problem.
57 Total equity capital is no more than 
6% of GDP.  Further, under relatively weak supervision many banks violate existing accounting 
rules, supplying the CBR with false financial statements.  Regional offices are alleged to ignore the 
exaggerated statements of financial performance.  According to the CBR 60% of banks overstated 
their profits and equity in official reports.  At the same time CBR regional offices classified 9% of 
these banks as stable and with no faults.  In addition, according to the CBR at least 20% of the 
banks classified as stable may be in difficulty.
58  To improve financial reporting, in October 2000 
the CBR launched the introduction of International Accounting Standards for six banks.  For these 
banks IAS based reports will be provided in 2001.  Other banks are expected to adopt IAS 
reporting, but over a process of many years.  While adopting IAS is highly beneficial, CBR 
authorities at all levels must also be diligent and determined in enforcing prudential regulations.  
While significant legislative progress has been made, CBR regulatory efforts are still insufficient.   
 
IV.  Concerns and Issues   
 
  It is clear that Russian policy makers have made much progress in reconstructing the 
banking system in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis.  Recent legislation has increased the authority 
of the Central Bank to expedite bankruptcy and restructuring programs for individual banks and 
the economic recovery has provided an environment for improving bank profitability.  The 
banking system in the aggregate, however, is still far from a vibrant, sound banking system. Koch 
(1998) provides a framework for analysis of the banking system presented in Table 6 below. In 
each of the six categories there is substantial work to be done. 
 
As mentioned above new legislation improved the legal juridical framework, but 
much of the legislation is untested in practice. The bankruptcy code is improved, but it is 
too early to tell if legal challenges and political pressures have been eliminated from the 
process.  Accounting, disclosure and transparency is improving and the CBR’s recent 
project on International Accounting Standards is a tremendous step.  However, even when 
bank reporting reveals problems authorities have been reluctant to take appropriate actions. 
For example, in the Spring of this year the CBR reported “the risk exposure of Russian 
banks exceeds all reasonable limits.”
59  But the CBR does not appear to be taking any 
action to ameliorate excessive risk exposure.  Will the CBR be able and willing to take a 
more active approach in system risk management?  
 
                                                           
57   This is for the banking system.  Of the approximately 1300 banks, the 1,115 smallest have capital ranging from 
US$0.1 million to US$5 million (Iskyan and Besedin (2001), p. 14).   Many of these institutions simply conduct 
treasury functions of their enterprise owner or operate as foreign exchange offices rather as banks 
58 Russsian Economic Trends, July 2000, p. 14. 
59 Russian Economic Trends, April 2000, p. 6.  While banks may be lending to more risky ventures there is also a 
serious problem in matching the term structure of assets and liabilities.  Approximately 25% of loans are for terms of 
one year or more whereas about 14% of liabilities are for a year or more.  Without a highly liquid, capital market with 
sufficient depth a liquidity crisis may easily develop. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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The 1998 crisis revealed that stakeholder oversight and institutional governance was a 
serious problem.  New legislation was required to better define the legal liabilities of managers and 
enable management to be replaced during the restructuring process. Internal controls were 
notoriously weak and creditor rights were not clearly delineated and forcefully represented by 
authorities during the early phase of restructuring.  Managers were able to strip the assets of banks 
and effectively rob depositors and creditors.  ARCO still holds ownership stakes in over a dozen 
banks in the process of restructuring and new legislation will likely enable the process to work 
more smoothly in the future.  However, political pressure and legal challenges will not likely 
disappear.     
 
Market structure issues, ranging from the concentration of the industry, efficiency of 
financial products markets, relative lack of lending to the private sector, ease of entry and 
development of new financial institutions are a serious concern.  Certain markets remain nearly 
monopolized. Sberbank’s domination of the household deposit market gives it enormous power in 
the enterprise lending market. Further, many argue there remains too much state ownership to 
effect competitive market-oriented behavior on the part of financial institutions.  Sberbank and 
Vneshtorg Bank are more than 50% owned by the Central Bank, ARCO has a dominant share of 
over a dozen institutions, and the Russian Federal Property Fund owns a majority of 
Roseksimbank. The creation of the Russian Development Bank and the Russian Agriculture Bank 
seem to move the industry toward greater participation by the state rather than less, and greater 
lending to state owned enterprises rather than to the private sector.  In addition, state organizations 
account for very large shares of deposits and assets for many banks.  All of which provides 
tremendous opportunity for political pressures to influence bank behavior.  One positive factor is 
that the Duma has required the Central Bank to divest itself of ownership of commercial banks by 
2005.  Exactly how this is done is of critical importance.  To date the Central Bank has sold its 
stake in five roszagranbanks to Vneshtorgbank – ownership remained in the state sector.  While 
this does remove one conflict of interest and enables the Central Bank to take a slightly greater 
arms length view of these banks, the state still has ownership of them and political pressures are 
only one small step further away.   
 
In addition, money and capital markets lack depth and breadth, which in turn may allow an 
individual, apparently healthy, participant to precipitate a market wrenching liquidity crunch.
60  In 
1995 the Central Bank was slow to provide additional liquidity and nearly 200 banks failed.   Can 
the Central Bank identify participants with excessive risk exposure and limit their participation to 
dampen system risk?  Tough supervisory and prudential regulation is required.  Given the 
admissions of rather lax enforcement of existing regulations, not so stringent enforcement of loan 
classification and provisioning requirements and the propensity for individual bank’s to distort 
information in the reporting process, serious questions remain.   
   
Finally, the safety net for depositors, an explicit, universal deposit insurance program, paid 
for by the banks, but targeting household depositors is critical.  It is the foundation for creating 
                                                           
60 For example, in May 2001 Infobank, a creditworthy institution with many large retail customers, nearly went 
bankrupt defaulting on payments on the inter-bank credit market.  This could have precipitated a liquidity crisis similar 
to that of 1995.  Russian Economic Trends, June 2001. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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greater confidence in the banking system and increasing the amount of savings mobilized and 
available for investment.  It also allows smaller banks to compete with Sberbank for deposits, 
promotes competition, reduces moral hazard and diversifies system risk.  Yet the Duma, after 
much debate and many readings has failed to act. 
 
In summary, tremendous change has taken place in the Russian banking system through the 
1990s and since the 1998 crisis.  The overall economic environment has improved and supported 
the recovery of the financial system.  It is an open question however, whether or not the systemic 
changes and the attitudes of regulators and policy makers have changed sufficiently to prevent a 
banking crisis comparable to that of 1998.    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Figure 1: Share of non-cash receipts for industrial firms 
 
 
Source: OECD (2000) p.85. Original Source: Russian Economic Barometer. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Table 1:    Types of Payments by Large Firms and Natural Monopolies by Industrial 
Branch, December 1998. (As a percentage of total payments). 
 
   Cash  Offsets  Securities  Barter  Other  Total 
 
All  firms  43.4 29.5 11.5  7.5  8.1  100 
Electricity  19.5 45.2 16.7  4.1 14.5  100 
Fuels  39.4 36.5 15.2  4.7  4.2  100 
Machine-building  
      and metalwork  14.1  37.4  31.3  13.5  3.7  100 
Construction &  
     Construction 
      materials   26.0   44.6  7.8  18.5  3.1  100 
Transportation  37.4 45.8 11.0  0.3  5.5  100 
Light industry and  
     food  69.8  12.7  4.0  7.6  5.9  100 
Agriculture  65.1 3.3 0.5  28.6 2.5  100 
Trade and public 
    catering  84.4  11.6  3.2  0.3  0.5  100 
 
Source:  OECD (2000), p. 87.  Original source Goskomstat. 
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Table 2: Total Domestic Credit and Private Sector Credit as per cent of  
    GDP and Market Economy Benchmark. 
 
1994   1999 
 
Total  Domestic     31.7   32.7 
Credit, % of GDP  
  
ME Benchmark, %    52.0    51.3 
 
Proportion of  
Benchmark  level   61.0   63.7 
 
Private  Sector      12.1   11.5 
Credit, % of GDP 
 
ME Benchmark, %    44.2    43.3 
 
Proportion of  
Benchmark  level   27.4   26.6 
 
 
Source: Derived from Tables 1 and 2 of Fries and Taci (2001). 
Benchmarks are based upon regression estimates of each ratio as a 
function of GNP per capita for a sample of 127 market economies. 
See Fries and Tacci (2001) for details.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Table 3: Consolidated Accounts of Credit Institutions (million rubles, December 31)
1 
 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
 
Reserves
2    36712.3 47123.4 72974.5 67762.9  160017.3  301124.5 
Foreign  assets  46149.4 72874.8 72717.3  219593.0  370651.3  476581.8 
Claims  on  general  govt. 62638.5 150721.3 194689.0 259401.6 437675.2 526020.7 
   of which, claims on  721.7  2790.4  18691.8  24445.6  19870.5  18531.3 
   governments of constituent 
   territories of RF and local  
   self-government bodies 
Claims on non-financial  62460.4  69371.4 33217.4 33078.8 46901.2 73972.6 
  state enterprises 
Claims  on  non-financial  133786.8 157337.2 236438.4 345962.6 521644.8 867132.2     
  private enterprises and  
  households 
Claims on other financial  525.0  242.0  8075.9  7270.7  13060.2  14525.0 
   Institutions 
 
Total  Assets  342272.4 497670.1 618112.5 933069.6  1549950.0  2259356.8 
 
Demand  deposits  69331.9  87303.0 162532.1 149470.7 249673.7 443020.9 
Time,  saving  and  foreign  124496.6 164898.7 158714.8 283996.1 456527.8 680646.9 
  currency deposits 
     of which, deposits in  55255.7  69447.7  80454.7  190872.7  290212.9  420090.5 
     foreign currency 
Deposits, access                           --                       --                   6270.5            22595.1            10223.6              6373.3 
   temporarily restricted
3 
Money  market  instruments  11858.5 30372.2 42435.9 43311.9  107817.2  191059.0 
Foreign  liabilities  29969.8  58892.5 104197.4 203136.8 222626.6 248920.7 
General  government  9741.1 11557.2 18236.1 20676.5 28671.8 54547.2 
  deposits 
    of which, deposits of   4251.9  4210.6  9139.9  10148.2  15626.8  36641.8 
   governments of constituent 
   territories of RF and local  
   self-government bodies 
Obligations to monetary   8005.1  6798.8  8779.8  71893.6  200121.4  205439.4 
  authorities 
Capital accounts  66687.8  123817.5 143909.4 157594.7 293199.4 437265.2 
 
Sundry  (balance)  22181.5  14030.3 -26963.5 -19605.7 -18911.6  -7915.9 
_____ 
Notes: 
1.  From the consolidated balance sheets of credit institutions, Sberbank Savings Bank, and Vneshekonombank. 
2.  Reserves of credit institutions comprise cash reserves in vaults and their funds in accounts with the Central 
Bank of the Russian Federation.  
3.  Deposits with temporarily limited access comprise funds in accounts with credit institutions which cannot be 
used by their holders within a certain time limit in accordance with a contract or transaction terms or current 
conditions of a credit institution’s activity. 
 
Source: The Bulletin of Banking Statistics, various issues, Central Bank of the Russian Federation William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Table 4:  Selected Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, including Sberbank.  
  (In billion rubles). 
 
 
  Total Assets  Claims on  Claims on Bank  savings  Foreign  Foreign 
    the general  the private  by Russian  currency  liabilities 
   government  sector  citizens  deposits 
      (ruble  household 
      deposits) 
 
    
1995  342.3 62.6  133.8 70.6 55.3 30.0 
1996  497.7 150.7 157.3 118.4  69.4  58.9 
1997  622.7 191.5 225.9 148.2  80.5 104.2 
1998  933.1 259.4 346.0 149.5 190.9 203.1 
1999  1549.7 437.7 521.6 211.1 290.2 222.5 
2000  2259.4 526.0 867.1 304.2 420.1 249.0 
2001  2472.0 561.3 989.2 342.5 477.1 256.4 
   (April) 
 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, June 2001, Original Source:  Goskomstat, CBR William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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  Table 5:  Banking System Characteristics (end of period). 
 
  1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
Assets/GDP  22.2% 23.2% 25.1% 34.0% 32.6% 32.0% 
 
H.H.  Deposits/  4.6% 5.5% 6.0% 5.5% 4.4% 4.3% 
GDP 
Loans/Assets  39.0% 31.6% 36.3% 37.1% 33.7% 38.4% 
 
Loans/GDP  8.7%  7.3%  9.1% 12.6% 11.0% 12.3% 
 
 
Source:  calculated from tables 2 and A-1. 
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Figure 2: Household Deposits in Sberbank and other commercial banks in billion rubles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________ 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, June 1999, p. 4. Original Source: Goskomstat 
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Figure 3: Share of commercial banks’ claims on the private sector and share of excess reserves in 
total assets (%) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ivanova and Schoors (2000) p. 5 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Table 6: Indicators of a Robust Financial System 
 
1.  Legal and juridical framework 
  Well-defined property rights and contract law 
  Market contracts easily enforceable in practice 
  Ability to pledge and seize collateral 
 Well-developed  bankruptcy  code 
 
2.  Accounting, disclosure and transparency 
  Loan valuation, asset classification and provisioning practices reflecting sound assessment of  
  counterparties 
Effective and regular auditing mechanisms 
  Information on the creditworthiness of financial institutions made publicly available on a regular,  
  frequent  basis 
  Timely publication of relevant aggregate financial data (macroeconomic indicators, reserves,  
  banking  sector  statistics,  etc.) 
  Availability of impartial credit-rating or credit information facilities 
 
3.  Stakeholder oversight and institutional governance 
  Capital adequacy requirements commensurate with risk 
  Replacement of management for poor performance 
  Enforceable legal liability of managers 
  Pervasive use of effective systems of risk management and internal control 
 
4.  Market structure 
  Financial sector open to qualified new entrants, including those from abroad 
  Share of foreign participants in total assets 
  Financial sector concentration ratios 
  Liquid interbank money and capital markets 
  Regulations permitting a full range of financial instruments 
  Sound and effective payment and settlement systems 
 
5.  Supervisory/regulatory authority 
  Independent from political interference in the daily conduct of supervision and appropriate  
    accountability for achieving clearly defined objectives 
  Power to force disclosure, impose penalties, etc. 
  Adequate resources for staffing, training, compensation 
  Conducts supervision on a consolidated basis William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
33 
  Shares information with other supervisors 
  Verification of information on risk management and internal control systems and on asset quality by 
    regular examinations or external audits 
  Adherence to norms established by international consultative bodies (Basle Committee, etc.), in  
  principle  and  in  practice 
  Measures to address particular types of risk: 
    Evaluation of risk management systems 
  Connected  lending 
    Risk exposure and loan concentration 
    Special attention to foreign currency and interest rate risk management and exposures 
    Heightened scrutiny of asset quality and capital adequacy in the face of sharp asset price  
   movements 
  Strategy for addressing financial insolvency: 
    Procedures for prompt corrective action or the equivalent 
  Appropriate  exit  policy 
 
6.  Design of the safety net 
  Explicit rather than implicit deposit insurance, paid for by banks and targeted especially towards  
  protecting  small  depositors 
  Appropriate allocation of losses among stakeholders 
  Stringent conditionality for the use of public money 
 
 
Source: Koch (1998). Original source: Group of Ten (1997). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
Table A1: Selected Economic Activity 
 
  Nominal  Real  GDP,  Nominal Real Nominal Real 
 GDP  (s.a.)  consumption  consumption  expenditures  expenditures 
      of goods and  of goods and  on new  on new 
     services  services**  construction  construction 
       and  and 
       equipment  equipment 
 
 
    (R bn)  (1997=100)  (R bn)  (1995=100)  (R bn)  (1997=100) 
 
1995  1  540.5 102.6 664.8 100.0 267.0 128.5 
1996  2  145.7  99.1 950.1  97.9 376.0 105.3 
1997  2  478.6 100.0  1  124.0 100.9 408.8 100.0 
1998  2  741.1 95.1  1  339.9 95.5  407.1 88.0 
1999  4 757.2  100.2  2 191.7  82.7  670.4  92.7 
2000  7 063.4  108.6  2 911.4  91.0  1 165.2  108.8 
2001        1114.3  93.0 331.0 110.2 
   (April) 
 
__________ 
Notes: 
* Series on consumption and investment differs slightly from SNA concept. 
** Nominal consumption deflated by CPI. 
s.a.:   seasonally adjusted 
 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, February 2001. Original Source: CBR. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
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Table A2: Monetary Aggregates (end of period) 
 
 
  Monetary base  Net  Net  M0 -  M2***  Outstanding 
    international  domestic  currency in    stock of GKOs  
    Reserves  assets  circulation    and OFZs  
   (NIR)*  (NDA)**      nominal 
     
 
    (R bn)  ($ bn)  (R bn)  (R bn)  (R bn)  (R bn) 
 
1995  103.8  7.7 68.1 80.8  220.8 73.7 
1996  130.9  1.7 123.0 103.8 288.3 237.1 
1997  164.5  4.0 142.1 130.4 374.1 384.9 
1998  210.4  -8.4 249.3 187.8 448.3  n.a. 
1999  324.3  -3.2  0.0 266.5 704.7  n.a. 
2000  519.6 16.0 88.6  419.3  1144.3  184.2 
2001,  April  531.1  20.4  n.a. 435.4  1210.0 189.5 
 
_________ 
Notes: 
* Since June 2000 NIR and NDA are estimated by RET. 
** Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of the monetary authorities equal monetary base minus net 
international reserves.  NDA is calculated using exchange rates of R27/$ for 2000, R24.18/$ for 
1999, R6.0/$ for 1998, R5,560/$ for 1997, R4,640/$ for 1996, R3, 550/$ for 1995. In 1999 there 
were some changes in methodology for NDA and NIR data. 
*** M2 includes currency in circulation, demand deposits, and time deposits (there is a break in 
the series from December 1996, from then it includes only deposits at banks with active licenses). 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, June 2001, original source: CBR 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 455 
36 
Table A3: Interest rates (average annual rates)* 
 
 
 CBR  Lending  Deposit  Overnight GKO  RTS  index, 
 refinance  rate**  rate**  interbank  average  monthly 
 rate*     rate  secondary  average 
        market  yield,   
        all  maturities 
        
 
    (%)  (%) (%) (%) (%)  (01.09.95=100) 
 
1995  185 320.3 102.0 190.4 161.8  80.9 
1996  110  146.8 55.1 47.6 85.8  160.3 
1997  32 32.0 16.8 21.0 26.0  427.9 
1998  60 41.5 17.1 50.6  n.a.  277.6 
1999  57 40.1 13.7 14.8  n.a.  106.9 
2000  32  24.2 6.5 7.1  12.7  199.5 
2001,  April  25  17.4  3.5    166.0 
 
_________ 
Notes:  
* Unweighted monthly average. 
** Data prior to January 1997 are not compatible with current methodology.  From 1998 data on 
lending rate are for commercial banks excluding Sberbank. 
 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, June 2001, original source: CBR. 
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